Total Corruption And Inefficiency. How Was The HTS Blitzkrieg In Syria Possible?

Click to see the full-size image

The collapse of the front near Aleppo has revealed the chronic problems of the Syrian Arab Republic and its military. The crisis can only be resolved with serious reform, under Russian supervision.

The intensification of the fighting in Syria came as a great surprise to outside observers. In five days, the front line, which was stabilized in 2020, has changed position by more than a hundred kilometers, with the terrorists having captured more than 8,000 square kilometers. We are witnessing the collapse of the front line and the inability of the Syrian Arab Army to quickly restore the status quo. The civil war that has been raging in the country since 2011 has entered a new phase. It is too early to talk about its end, with President Bashar al-Assad having lost his grip on events. The current situation could lead to an even greater internationalization of the conflict than before.

The Turkish-backed fighters have demonstrated time and again that, despite the trappings of Islam, they see their own co-religionists as their main enemy.

“Why is it that those who are once again dragging the Syrian people into bloodshed, pathetically claiming the banner of Islam, have never condemned the actual genocide against the poor Palestinian people? This speaks volumes. If they could gather so much strength and resources, why did they not go to war against Israel, but again directed their efforts to killing Muslims?” said Apti Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat volunteer formation.

On November 27, terrorist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham began a major offensive, from Idlib province toward Aleppo. The attackers were supported by fighters from the Syrian National Army, which holds the northern part of Aleppo governorate. The defenses of the Syrian government troops collapsed during the first hours of the offensive. Within two days, the retreat turned into an uncontrolled flight. Resistance to the fighters was sporadic, and an information vacuum exacerbated the situation. Officials could only claim that the enemy was spreading fakes, while in reality the situation was under the control of the army command. The HTS successes proved the opposite.

By noon on November 29, there were no top officers left in the city of Aleppo, Syria’s largest population center before the war began. The command of the 30th Division of the Republican Guard had fled, as had senior military intelligence and officers of Air Force Intelligence Directorate. The remaining SAA fighters were left to fend for themselves. Some deserted to the rear, others put up heroic resistance without any chance of success. By the end of the day, the officers began destroying personal documents, setting fire to houses, and leaving Aleppo. By 17:00 there was no longer any central command of the garrison.

During the evening and night, the city came under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The HTS groups allowed some Syrian Arab Army soldiers to leave Aleppo and agreed to temporary neutrality with Kurdish units. By November 30, the fighters controlled the entire city except for Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiyah, which are densely populated by Kurds.

Now Aleppo has fallen, the HTS units have moved south towards the city of Hama. The SAA units left their positions in the Southern Idlib area without any serious resistance. In the afternoon of November 30, HTS maneuvering groups entered Hama without encountering any resistance. By nightfall, however, they were forced to leave the city as SAA reinforcements arrived. Units from the 25th Division and the 4th Division helped stabilize the situation, and the Syrian forces tried to launch a counteroffensive, having partial success. Currently, the fighting is taking place 10 kilometers north and northeast of Hama, and the operational crisis has not yet been resolved.

From December 1 to 3, Kurdish units left the outskirts of Aleppo, as agreed with the Syrian National Army. However, some Kurds are still trapped in the Sheikh Maqsud and Ashrafiya neighborhoods inside the city, from which they will have to negotiate with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to be granted a safe corridor. On December 3, Tahrir al-Sham captured Halfaya, Taibat al-Imam and Maardes north of Hama. The main task for the SAA remains to stabilize the front line north of Hama, suppress any unrest in the rear, attract large-scale foreign military aid, and create the conditions for a transition to a counteroffensive with decisive objectives.

However, it is impossible to accomplish these tasks without critically examining the fundamental reasons for the failure. The militant offensive exposed fatal wounds in the Syrian Arab Republic’s state and military apparatus. Information about the impending offensive had been reaching Damascus through the Russian Defense Ministry since the end of August 2024. The accumulation of ammunition in warehouses and the arrival of new recruits were recorded. Attempts at tactical offensives began in late September. The network of HTS agents in the rear of the Syrian Armed Forces became more active, but the SAA command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were de-facto inactive.

Damascus did nothing to equip fortifications in Aleppo province. Troop density was low, and there were no continuous minefields or reserve positions. There was a lack of reinforcement units in the front line. The positions of 2012-2016 were not used, being in a state of abandonment. The army was retreating into the void.

The most acute problem of the SAA was and is the lack of personnel in the units. Active units lack about 40% of fighters, sometimes up to 60%. As a result, there are full-blooded divisions on paper, but not in reality. The reinforcements reflect an even deeper problem – the widespread corruption of the Syrian army’s officer corps.

The motivation of SAA soldiers and officers is extremely low, whilst material support is at a very low level. This has led to numerous acts of extortion by the military against the local population. The authority of the authorities has been seriously undermined by outright extortion by the military. The M5 highway between Aleppo and Damascus has been illegally taxed, as in the Middle Ages; it has become impossible to pass without paying a bribe. Thus, undertaking military service has become a business. The situation has been exacerbated by ethno-religious differences between the local population and the troops. The Syrian Arab Army is half Alawite, and among the officers, there are even more Alawites, which is anathema to the Sunni majority. With an average salary of 20-30 dollars, Alawites in Syria receive significantly more.

The central government has relied mostly on the Alawite population. The formation of troops on a narrow sectarian basis has been intended to prevent possible rebellions. It is also related to the purging of the most professional commanders who had proved themselves in battles before the 2020 ceasefire. The most combat-ready units have been disbanded or reassigned. Ineffective socio-economic policies based on mundane corruption have resulted in a standard of living in the SAR that is inferior even to such poor neighboring countries as Lebanon and Iraq. The degradation of the economy and social infrastructure is in many cases greater than in areas controlled by the Kurds and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

The Syrian Arab Army is completely unprepared for the methods of modern warfare. The experience of the special military operation in Ukraine has passed them by, although the Syrian commanders could have gone directly to the Russians to learn the lessons of the violent conflict in Eastern Europe. They could have sent their representatives to the Ukrainian front and trained them directly in the field of combat operations, but nothing was done.

Unlike the Syrian troops, the HTS fighters have closely interacted with the Ukrainian security services. As a result, we see the extensive and effective use of FPV drones, resulting in the HTS groups having a significant advantage in aerial reconnaissance. The acute shortage of reconnaissance equipment held by the Syrian government forces has not been eliminated for 4 years. Only 2 Russian Zala reconnaissance drones were operating in the direction of Aleppo, and they could only fly 2 km beyond the line of contact, as Turkish electronic warfare systems did not allow them to operate further.

Finally, information security was not established at all, given that methods of communicating with the population are now extremely outdated. While the militants flood the Internet space with their content, the Syrian press is in a vacuum, resulting in inadequate responses to threats. The fact that the Syrian army retained control over Hama had to be confirmed by ordinary SAA soldiers, who recorded videos and posted them on social media to prevent panic.

All these issues could be solved by Russia’s direct involvement in Syria’s internal affairs. As a country that has provided enormous assistance, the Russian Federation is responsible for stability in the region, through recruiting the armed forces, including officers, punishing corruption and lack of discipline, and building fortifications. All of this must be done under the direct supervision of the Russian command. Moscow must also create an effective state apparatus, or the Syrian state will share the fate of Libya and Yemen. Given the ethnic and religious diversity of Syria, the consequences would be disastrous.

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Military Developments in Northern Syria Since The Start Of HTS Offensive (Maps, Video)
• U.S.-Backed Forces Launch Attack In Syria’s Deir Ezzor Amid HTS Offensive On Hama (Videos)
• Strikes Kill 400 Militants As HTS Offensive In Northern Syria Nears Complete Halt (Videos)