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Which cities under Russian control are not yet recognized by Polymarket? Which contracts will definitely not close in December? Which settlements must be captured to complete the clearance of Myrnohrad?
Predictive markets like Polymarket continue to serve as popular indicators of expectations related to the development of the military operation in Ukraine. As some contracts tied to the fall of settlements are resolved, investors’ attention shifts to new hotspots. However, the frontline dynamics from late November through the first half of December were surprising, radically altering forecasts and demonstrating the impressive pace of the Russian advance on key sectors.
In this article, we analyze the operational situation in the most important sectors of the front from December 6 to 16 using current reports and data. Based on this information, we evaluate the likelihood that Russian forces will gain control of several strategically important cities. Our focus is on the dynamic events near Siversk and the critical situations in Myrnohrad and Huliaipole, as well as the ongoing offensive on the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk sectors.
Kupyansk
In this sector, the offensive operation was methodical, aimed at blocking an important transportation hub. The main effort was concentrated on encircling the city and cutting off its logistical routes. Russian units advanced along the Oskil River, capturing adjacent settlements and threatening to completely isolate the Ukrainian garrison. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched counterattacks to break the blockade, but they did not yield significant results. Thus, despite active resistance, Kupyansk was semi-encircled by mid-December, and its fate depended on the AFU’s ability to maintain control of the last supply roads under constant fire.
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Konstantinovka
The battles for this major fortified area were intense but positional during the indicated period. After consolidating successes on the flanks, such as capturing Pleshcheievka and Nelepivka, Russian forces continued their assault on the southeastern outskirts of the city. The main tactical objective was to establish and expand footholds in residential areas while simultaneously disrupting supply routes to the garrison from Druzhkivka. Despite local successes and damage inflicted on the AFU ‘s, Konstantinovka, as a powerful fortified area, required lengthy preparation for a full-scale assault. Therefore, by mid-December, capturing it did not appear to be imminent, and the operation aimed to further exhaust the defenders.
Vovchansk
By the period under review, Russian troops had already taken control of this city. The main combat operations shifted to adjacent territories, including the areas of Vilcha, Lyman, and Prylypka to the south and the area of Vovchanski Khutory to the east. Russian units used Vovchansk as a rear base and bridgehead to develop an offensive deeper into the Kharkiv region, methodically expanding their zone of control. Interestingly, despite apparent control and reports thereof, a contract for capturing Vovchansk by December 31 remained active on the Polymarket platform. As of December 17, the odds of its resolution (Yes) were estimated at only 9%. This discrepancy can be explained by the contract’s specific terms, which favor “Yes” only if the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) independently verifies and marks the entire Vovchansk municipality as captured by Russian forces by the specified date. Since the ISW often lags in updates during rapid offensives, a unique market situation was created where actual control did not coincide with the contract’s formal resolution.
Lyman
According to the data, Russian troops had established full control over Lyman by December 11th. They achieved this success through a coordinated offensive from several directions: from the east, with a bridgehead in the Masyakovka area, and from the north, after capturing Yampil and Stavky. In the days following the announcement of the capture, efforts focused on consolidating the success, expanding the buffer zone around the city, and repelling potential AFU counterattacks. As with Vovchansk, ISW is lagging in coloring the territory. For this reason, the probability of resolving the contract (Yes) is estimated at only 7%, despite the city having been under the Russian Army’s full control for a week.
Myrnohrad
By mid-December, Russian troops were approaching the final stage of their operation to capture Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian garrison in the city was completely encircled. Despite statements by UAF Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi denying the encirclement, the situation on the ground was critical. According to frontline reports, logistics were provided almost exclusively via heavy drones and ground-based robotic complexes, and moving through the city was extremely risky. Unlike the street-fighting tactics in Pokrovsk, the Russian tactic involved methodically splitting the defense into isolated pockets while simultaneously launching massive airstrikes, including heavy aerial bombs, on central quarters to suppress the last pockets of resistance.
The most significant events that predetermined the outcome of the battle were Russian unit breakthroughs to key facilities in the center of Myrnohrad. By mid-December, Russian troops had taken control of the Central Market, an important transport hub, and advanced to the substation near the city pond, the heart of the garrison’s defense. This deep penetration, along with the capture of the motor depot, lyceum, and police station in the western part of the city, enabled the splitting of the Ukrainian defense and paralyzed the AFU units’ command. Meanwhile, Russian troops continued to tighten the encirclement from the outside. In the north, near the Zaporizkyi Khutir farm, they narrowed the “neck of the cauldron,” finally blocking any remaining opportunities for supply or retreat.
By December 17–18, the final situation in Myrnohrad was characterized by the complete liquidation of a unified defense front. According to some reports, the remnants of the Ukrainian garrison were split into several isolated pockets. The most stubborn resistance was expected in the area of the «Tsentralna» mine, referred to as the «last citadel». Despite orders from the political leadership to hold the city at all costs, the Ukrainian command pulled reserves, including the 155th and 118th Brigades, to the Serhiivka and Hrishyne areas in an attempt to break the blockade. However, these attempts were local in nature and yielded no results. The fall of Myrnohrad, predicted by many analysts before the end of December, became a matter of days. This opened the possibility for Russian troops to advance further into the Donetsk region.
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Huliaipole
By mid-December, this sector had become the site of one of the most rapid breakthroughs. Russian troops overcame the key water barrier, the Haichur River, and established themselves on its left bank to create bridgeheads for a further advance. Fierce battles raged through the city, during which assault groups reached the city center, including the market and hospital areas. Reports indicate that Russian units split the city by reaching Vyshneva Street and Polohovskyi Shliakh. This created a threat of the Ukrainian grouping being split and encircled. Given the pace of advancement and the fragmented nature of the AFU defense, it was assessed that there was a high likelihood that the city would be completely captured by the end of December. As of December 17th, the odds of Huliaipole’s capture by December 31st were 37% on the Polymarket platform, and by January 31st, they were 82%, reflecting the market’s confidence in the city’s imminent fall.
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Hrishyne and Rodynske
These settlements became pivotal locations in the battle to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. By mid-December, Russian units were engaged in heavy fighting to gain full control of Hrishyne, the last major node on the supply route from Pokrovsk. Taking Hrishyne would have meant severing the Ukrainian grouping’s logistics in Myrnohrad once and for all. Information in reports from December 7th–16th was less detailed about Rodynske, which served as an important bridgehead for developing the offensive on Hrishyne from the northeast. The struggle for these two locations was extremely fierce, and their fate directly determined the timing and outcome of the fall of Myrnohrad. Once the Russian army had captured Pokrovsk and completed the clearing of Myrnohrad, it would take no more than one or two weeks to take Hrishyne and Rodynske.
Conclusion
These settlements became pivotal locations in the battle to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. By mid-December, Russian units were engaged in heavy fighting to gain full control of Hrishyne, the last major node on the supply route from Pokrovsk. Taking Hrishyne would have meant severing the Ukrainian grouping’s logistics in Myrnohrad once and for all. Information in reports from December 7th–16th was less detailed about Rodynske, which served as an important bridgehead for developing the offensive on Hrishyne from the northeast. The struggle for these two locations was extremely fierce, and their fate directly determined the timing and outcome of the fall of Myrnohrad. Once the Russian army had captured Pokrovsk and completed the clearing of Myrnohrad, it would take no more than one or two weeks to take Hrishyne and Rodynske.
In other strategic sectors, Russian troops advanced to the decisive phase of the offensive, setting the stage for major successes in January. Most notably, this applies to Huliaipole, where crossing the Haichur River and breaking through to the central districts brought the Ukrainian garrison to the brink of catastrophe. The stubborn yet fragmented AFU resistance in the city will likely only delay the inevitable. Similarly, around Kupyansk, the methodical tightening of the ring and interception of logistics have led to the city’s operational semi-encirclement, though its complete capture, as with the powerful fortress of Konstantinovka, will require time for the final «mopping up» of defenses.
An interesting paradox has emerged regarding the already captured cities of Vovchansk and Lyman, where the market mechanics of Polymarket conflict with operational reality. Despite Russian troops’ established control of the cities and their use as a bridgehead for further advances, Polymarket’s contract for their capture by December 31 maintained an extremely low probability: 9% for Vovchansk and 7% for Lyman. This demonstrates how the technical conditions for resolving bets can lag behind the actual situation on the front. In this case, the technical condition was an update of the map by the independent agency ISW. The current operational situation and market expectations suggest that the Russian December successes laid a solid foundation for a large-scale offensive at the beginning of the new year. The most likely immediate goals are Huliaipole and the complete clearance of the Pokrovsk Sectors.
Our regular reports provide the information necessary to draw substantiated conclusions about the development of the situation on the front. However, it is important to remember that the dynamics of hostilities can change rapidly and that this analysis does not constitute an investment recommendation.
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thats part of how western white monopoly capitalism work.never criticize them,never tell truth bout their failure.now that trump were expose by scape goat oil piracy in the name of drug cartel ship bombing.icc quickly wants to release duterte to avoid blame.clear two tongue double standard.
porque são jovens de extrema-direita que nem sabem que as cidades já foram conquistadas, são burros sem cérebro em achar que os ukros estão vencendo. a extrema-direita mundial é muito burra e idiota. ela simplesmente não pensa.