The Myth Of The ‘Magic Wand’: Why The Tomahawks Won’t Win The War

A Tomahawk cruise missile fired from an Australian warship, moments before impacting its target. (U.S. Navy)

Why the United States cannot afford large-scale supplies. Rich adaptation experience – how the Russian military can counter a new threat. What prevents the US from starting missile deliveries in the near future.

The US is considering transferring Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine, a weapon capable of reaching Moscow. Kiev is waiting for them to turn the tide in the war. Moscow promises an apocalypse. What happens if this really happens? Let’s look at the facts: the capabilities of the missiles, the Pentagon’s arsenal, and the real consequences for the front.

The «Tomahawk» war hatchet: history and capabilities

The Tomahawk is not just a missile; it is an entire family of high-precision, long-range cruise missiles that have been in service since 1983. It is a subsonic missile (approximately 885 km/h) whose key feature is its ability to fly at extremely low altitudes (30–50 metres), skimming the terrain, which makes it difficult for air defence systems to detect and intercept. Thanks to its combined guidance system (inertial, TERCOM, GPS and DSMAC), the US military claims that its circular error probable (CEP) is just a few metres, ensuring a high degree of strike accuracy.(Add quotation pls)

Comparative Specifications: Tomahawk (Block IV) vs. Other Missiles

Since they were introduced, Tomahawk missiles have been used by the US Navy in every major conflict, from the 1991 Gulf War and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to strikes in Syria and Yemen. For example, in 2018, the US, UK and France jointly attacked Syrian facilities linked to chemical weapons programmes with over 100 missiles, including Tomahawks. In April 2017, 59 Tomahawk missiles were launched at the Shayrat airbase in Syria in response to the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun. Furthermore, these missiles continue to be used for precision strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, demonstrating their effectiveness in hitting well-defended targets while keeping pilots safe.

Arsenal and production: Can the US satisfy the demand?

A key quantitative question arising in these discussions is: Is the US capable of transferring a significant number of these missiles without undermining its own defence capabilities?

The primary platforms for Tomahawk missiles are US Navy ships and submarines. There are over 140 platforms of various types in service.

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: 74 ships, each capable of carrying 90–96 missiles in Mk 41 vertical launching systems (VLS).

Ticonderoga-class cruisers: Nine to thirteen ships, each with a payload of up to 122 missiles.

Submarines: – Multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the Virginia class (23 boats, with a payload of up to 40 missiles each); Los Angeles class submarines (approximately 20 boats); Four converted Ohio-class SSGNs, each of which is capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk missiles.

In total, loading all ships with a full complement of Tomahawk missiles, even without a reserve, requires more than 12,000 missiles. According to open-source data, the total stockpile of Block IV and Block V Tomahawk missiles is estimated at approximately 3,757 units (as of early 2024). Between 2004 and 2020, 3,882 Block IV missiles were produced, and a further 260 Block V missiles were manufactured by 2023. The sole producer is the Raytheon consortium. Historical production rates were around 200–250 missiles per year, but according to the Pentagon, these have recently increased. The cost of one missile is approximately $1.9–2 million (based on prices from 2022–2024).

Given the necessity of maintaining the combat readiness of its own fleet, the cornerstone of US global strategy, it is unlikely that Washington will be able to afford to transfer thousands of Tomahawks. The discussion will most likely concern the supply of several dozen, or in an optimistic scenario for Kyiv, several hundred missiles in batches. This is a weapon of strategic impact, not intended for daily use on the front lines.

Why supplying Tomahawks is a complex and lengthy process

Even if a political decision is made, immediate delivery will not occur for several reasons.

1. The platform problem. The Tomahawk is fundamentally a sea-based missile. Ukraine does not have any cruisers or submarines equipped with Mk 41 VLS systems. The only option is a ground-based mobile complex. The US has developed and tested such a system: the MRC ‘Typhon’, which is based on the Mk 41 VLS. However, this is a new and complex system that is not yet in widespread use. Deploying it, training the crew and integrating it into Ukraine’s command system would take many months, if not longer. 
2. Political risks and escalation. With a range of up to 2,500 km, the Tomahawk poses an entirely new threat. This means that not only frontline logistical hubs, but also strategic assets deep within Russia — including Moscow — could be targeted. As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted, the key questions are “Who is launching them, and who is designating the targets: Americans or Ukrainians?’ Moscow has explicitly stated that this would cross its ‘red lines’ and could lead to a ‘symmetrical response’, which could include attacks on the infrastructure of intermediary states. Unlike similar statements made in the past, however, potential strikes on the Kremlin could lead to these threats being fulfilled. The US administration, especially ahead of elections, will weigh these risks extremely carefully. 
3. The West’s strategic dependency. The fact that the transfer of Tomahawks is being discussed may indicate a lack of alternative weapons in the West that could have a similar effect on the battlefield. This forces them to consider riskier options. The Russian Armed Forces have adapted to all types of weaponry supplied by the US. If they were to adapt to Tomahawk strikes, the US would have no more aces up its sleeve.

Lessons from HIMARS and ATACMS: How Russia adapts to new threats

The history of this conflict shows that the Russian army is able to adapt in response to its adversaries acquiring new weapon systems.

Following the delivery of HIMARS/M270 in the summer of 2022, for example, the Ukrainian Armed Forces gained the ability to effectively strike ammunition depots and command posts in the immediate rear. Initial effectiveness was very high. However, it took the Russian command 2–3 months to begin effectively countering this threat. Measures included:

• Dispersing and camouflaging depots.
• Active use of electronic warfare (EW) systems to jam GPS guidance.
• Relocating key assets beyond the guaranteed engagement range (approximately 80 km at the time).
• Organizing ambushes using strike UAVs to hunt launchers.

ATACMS: Delivering these operational-tactical missiles with a greater range of up to 300 km in 2023–2024 expanded Ukraine’s capabilities once again. Adapting to them also took several months and involved further logistical dispersion, enhanced air defense cover for the most critical assets and continued active use of electronic warfare.

Analysis of adaptation to Tomahawks:

• The scale of the threat posed by the Tomahawk and the necessary countermeasures are an order of magnitude greater. However, Russia will have more time to adapt due to delays in system deployment.
• Establishing a new, comprehensive countermeasure architecture could take between six and twelve months. However, individual measures will be implemented immediately and continuously.
• The most obvious measure is to destroy “Typhon” launchers while they are on the move or in position, before they can be used. Reconnaissance, strike UAVs and cruise missiles will be employed for this purpose.
• Despite its low observability, the Tomahawk is vulnerable to modern air defense systems. Its subsonic speed and predictable (albeit low) flight profile make it vulnerable to systems such as the S-300/400, Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M3. A key factor will be the multi-layered placement of SAMs to cover all flight levels, including ultra-low altitudes.
• EW systems may attempt to jam the missile’s satellite GPS navigation and data links. However, the TERCOM system, which is based on terrain contour matching, is autonomous and resistant to such interference. This makes electronic warfare (EW) an auxiliary, not a primary, means of engagement.
• Critically important assets in the deep rear will be dispersed, camouflaged and hardened even further. The redeployment of some strategic assets even further from potential launch points is possible.
• Active efforts will be made to identify and destroy not only the launchers, but also the associated support and logistics systems for operating the Tomahawks.

Conclusion:

The potential transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine would not merely be another escalatory step, but a qualitative leap that would take the conflict to a new and even more dangerous level. From a technical standpoint, this weapon would give the Ukrainian Armed Forces unprecedented capabilities for striking strategic targets in Russia. However, the path from political decision to real-world combat use is likely to be long. Besides logistical and production obstacles, the political ramifications of this decision will weigh heavily on the US administration.

Experience shows that Russia has the ability to adapt to new challenges. However, the fight against Tomahawk missiles will require significant resources and a complete restructuring of its air defense system, making it a difficult and risky endeavor. It is important to note that Tomahawk missiles are not a magic solution. They cannot turn the tide of war on their own. The US launched 59 Tomahawk missiles in an attack on a single airbase in Syria, and a full-scale conflict would require thousands more. Therefore, these attacks will not bring about a swift victory, but rather will dramatically increase the stakes for all parties involved and delay any potential negotiations for an extended period of time.

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