Brief Analysis Of The Future Of Iraq’s Leading Shiite Parties

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Written by Damir Nazarov

Sadrists

The most impressive political force in Iraq, which, despite its strong social bias, still has a serious weakness. The Sadrist movement is largely based on the charisma of its leader, Muqtada Sadr, respectively, in the event of the departure or death of a cleric, the organization promises an inevitable split due to the appearance of future disagreements existing within the party.

Sadrists promise to split into four groups: 1 – anti–Iranian, 2 – pro-Iranian, 3 – followers of Muqtada and 4 – moderate pragmatists. The first group can be described as the smallest due to its extreme nationalism and sectarian principles, in some ways they resemble the followers of the pseudo-Ulama Mahmoud Sarhi and the radicals of the Tishrin movement. The second group, on the contrary, is becoming more numerous, it includes Sadrist elders, authoritative clerics and some of the commanders of Saraya as-Salam (military militia). The third group will appear as a result of the “traditional mainstream”, which appears on the wave of popular love for the departed politician and the subsequent reaction to the resulting split of the movement from some of the political figures already close to the leader. The fourth side will resemble the current “coordination structure” in nature, with the only difference that instead of an alliance of political parties, there will be an alliance of various currents and offshoots of Sadrists.

BADR

Unlike the Sadrists, the former military wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (ISCI)”it is not prone to strong division. Apparently, even the departure of an influential figure in the person of Hadi al-Ameri will not affect the ranks of BADR, since there are no strong disagreements within the party and a common position on “external challenges” within the party. By “challenges” I mean competition for the Shiite electorate from the DAWA Party and the threat of expanding the influence of Sadrists. Another argument that forces BADR’s politicians not to allow a split in their ranks is control over Hashad al-Shaabi, where about 70 percent of the combat formations are created by BADR. Therefore, any split in the party can negatively affect the institution of Popular Mobilization Forces.

DAWA

A veteran of the Iraqi political arena and one of the pioneers of the local “political Islam” is going through hard times. It is no exaggeration to say that DAWA strongly depends on the figure of Nouri al-Maliki, the second factor of the party’s survival is associated with an alliance with small Islamic parties (for example, the Islamic Talea Party), which together form an alliance – a “legal coalition”. Exclude these two factors and DAWA may turn into an outsider in the political space of Iraq. Nevertheless, it is too early to bury the oldest Islamic party in Iraq, because they still have an iron-clad electorate, which, together with its allies, forms a strong community. Thus, DAWA is something of a “hostage” of Maliki’s leadership, which on the one hand is a sign of the “authority of the party”, but on the other hand, it is his figure that is associated with the emerging stagnation of the party.

ISCI

Another Shiite veteran of Iraq, despite all the difficulties, continues his political path. After the assassination of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in 2003, the Supreme Council gradually lost its authority among the Shiite community over the years. In 2018, the then leader of the organization, Ammar Hakim, left ISCI and founded his own Al-Hikma party. But despite the departure of a number of religious figures after Hakim, there was no tangible blow to the Supreme Council. Moreover, the “hawks of the party” have now entered the first fields, which allowed the oldest Islamic party to get rid of its former forced conformity with the Americans. Today, ISCI is one of the main supporters of the withdrawal of the occupiers and the reform of the ruling quota system. Nevertheless, at the moment, the legendary Islamic party has practically turned into an activist of the provincial councils. As for internal diplomacy, the current ISCI leadership maintains friendly or warm relations with all Shiite parties, including Sadrists. This allows the Supreme Council to conclude agreements on the creation of new alliances or political blocs at any time.

Conclusion. Despite the broad populism of absolutely all Islamic parties in Iraq, there is still a share of ideology. The conditions of the quota system regime do not allow the Islamic worldview of Shiite parties to fully realize themselves, therefore the absolute majority of the Shiite political space has put on the cloak of “secular secularism”.

At the moment, nothing threatens the existence of all these parties, but the lack of development of such parties as DAWA or ISCI promises inevitable stagnation. Accordingly, the emergence of a serious opposition with revolutionary thinking promises collapse for many Shiite parties. A striking example is the popularity of the Sadrist movement, which forces everyone else to unite in order to avoid loneliness in the face of the growing popularity of Muqtada Sadr.

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