The rapid advance of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) along Yemen’s western coast is testing the willingness of Saudi Arabia’s partners to intervene, with the United States declining Riyadh’s request for direct strikes, Pakistan stopping short of a military response and Turkey offering strong political support but no announced combat role.
The Houthis have pushed toward the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. The group seized the Red Sea port city of Mokha on September 10 and the next day reached Dhubab after capturing Perim, also known as Mayyun, an island whose position gives it particular importance for control of the waterway.
The advance has sharply increased the pressure on Saudi Arabia, which backs Yemen’s internationally recognized government and has come under a renewed barrage of Houthi missiles and drones.
The kingdom now faces the possibility that the Houthis could consolidate positions along the Red Sea coast while also threatening a maritime route that has become more important as fighting around the Strait of Hormuz disrupts shipping farther east.
Washington has so far drawn a clear distinction between supporting Saudi Arabia and directly entering the renewed Yemeni war.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made two calls to President Donald Trump on September 10 asking the U.S. to launch strikes against the Houthis, according to Axios. Trump declined, and U.S. officials told Reuters that the administration currently has no plans for direct military engagement with the group.
Despite not committing to direct strikes, the U.S. expanded its military support for Saudi Arabia. More than 100 U.S. military advisers are now in the kingdom providing intelligence and targeting support for the kingdom’s campaign against the Houthis, according to CNN, which cited five sources familiar with the operations.
One U.S. official put the number of personnel involved at roughly 200. The advisers are working as part of a newly established joint forces command formed in recent weeks amid increased Iranian support for the Houthis.
The reluctance reflects the competing demands on the U.S. military. The Trump administration is already heavily engaged in the conflict with Iran and has been concentrating on the Strait of Hormuz, while officials have said their immediate objective regarding Yemen is to keep the Red Sea open rather than assume responsibility for the wider conflict between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces.
That position leaves Riyadh in an awkward position. Saudi Arabia remains a major U.S. security partner, but the latest Houthi gains have not persuaded Washington to replicate the kind of direct air campaign it previously conducted against the group.
Instead, the U.S. is seeking to contain the consequences of the conflict while providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeting assistance, without becoming responsible for reversing the Houthis’ territorial gains on the ground.
The stakes are particularly high because the Houthis are now operating close to Bab el-Mandeb. The Strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is a vital route for international commerce and energy shipments. The Associated Press reported that roughly 12% of global oil and other goods normally pass through the waterway, although traffic has already been reduced by previous Houthi attacks and the wider regional conflict.
Pakistan’s position is more complicated because Islamabad has both a security commitment to Saudi Arabia and a diplomatic relationship with Iran.
Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence last month, under which an armed attack on one of the three countries is to be regarded as an attack on all three. The agreement has since been institutionalized through a joint political and defense committee.
Pakistan initially signaled that the pact could become relevant if Saudi Arabia continued to come under attack. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on September 9 that attacks on Saudi territory could activate the agreement. But Islamabad subsequently sought to lower expectations of an immediate military response.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan said on September 10 that no military reaction under the pact was currently being discussed. He said Pakistan would act “when the time comes,” while declining to specify what form that action might take.
Reuters also reported that Islamabad had warned Iran to restrain its Houthi allies and had condemned the attacks on Saudi Arabia.
The caution is significant. Pakistan is attempting to preserve its position as an intermediary between the U.S. and Iran while maintaining its defense relationship with Saudi Arabia. Reuters reported on September 11 that Islamabad is under growing pressure to choose sides as the Yemen conflict becomes intertwined with the wider U.S.-Iran confrontation.
For now, Pakistan appears determined to preserve the deterrent value of the Makkah agreement without automatically translating it into participation in the Yemen war.
Turkey has adopted a similarly cautious position, although Ankara has been more explicit than Pakistan in publicly condemning the Houthi attacks.
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said September 8 that it “condemn[s] in the strongest terms” the attacks on Saudi Arabia, reaffirmed support for Saudi sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called on the Houthis to halt their actions. Ankara also said the attacks were undermining diplomatic efforts to reach a lasting political settlement in Yemen.
At the same time, Turkey has not publicly announced that it will conduct strikes in Yemen or deploy forces there in response to the Houthi advance.
That restraint is notable because Turkey is not merely a political supporter of Saudi Arabia. It is a signatory, alongside Pakistan, to the new Makkah defense arrangement.
At a meeting of the pact’s political and defense committee in Istanbul on August 31, the three governments pledged to strengthen their collective deterrence and defense capabilities, but they also emphasized de-escalation, restraint and the pursuit of peaceful solutions to regional crises.
Turkey’s current posture therefore amounts to support without an announced military commitment. Ankara has backed Saudi Arabia’s right to defend itself and condemned the Houthis, but has not publicly said that the latest Houthi territorial gains warrant Turkish intervention.
For Riyadh, the problem is no longer limited to missile and drone attacks on Saudi territory. The Houthis’ recent advances have brought the group much closer to the Bab el-Mandeb.
Reuters reported that control of Dhubab would be important to gaining control of the strait, while the Associated Press described Mokha’s capture as the Houthis’ most significant territorial gain since the 2022 ceasefire.
That makes the Saudi quest for outside intervention more urgent. Yet the three countries Riyadh might look to for assistance are currently stopping short of the kind of intervention that could immediately alter the battlefield.
The U.S. has rejected a request for direct strikes while expanding intelligence and targeting support, Pakistan says no military response is presently under discussion, and Turkey has offered diplomatic and political backing without announcing a combat role.
For now, that leaves Saudi Arabia confronting a rapidly changing battlefield largely through its own forces and its Yemeni allies. Odds are certainly not on the side of the kingdom.
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ha ha joint defense contract not offense and if mafia don won’t jump in means us is spreading itself to thin