Israel Wants War And A “Decisive Victory” Because Its Future Is At Risk

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Written by Piero Messina

We are dancing in the crater of a volcano. Israel has decided: it will attack Gaza by air, by land and by sea. The Tel Aviv government’s decision exposes the entire Middle East to a long and cruel conflict, the final geopolitical consequences of which are completely unpredictable. At stake, however, is not only the survival of Palestine (if one ever existed), but also of Israel.

The pressure exerted by Tsahal on the Gaza Strip may have repercussions on the entire area, with Egypt and Jordan fearing for their internal stability. More than two million Palestinians are at risk of hunger due to depleting food supplies, says a representative of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip. A massive wave of refugees from Palestine could cause the political and social default of the two state entities. It is therefore no coincidence that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Jordanian King Abdallah II have decided to take a common posture against Israel’s moves, condemning what is defined as “collective punishment in the siege or displacement” of Palestinians.

The two leaders warn that prolonging the war in Gaza risks dragging the region into a “catastrophe”, and launch a new appeal to immediately stop the war, protect civilians, lift the siege and provide humanitarian aid to the Palestinian enclave. To avoid any misunderstanding, Egyptian President Al Sisi also clarified that “the idea of ​​displacing Palestinians to Sinai means dragging Egypt into a war against Israel.

For sure Tel Aviv understands that hundreds of thousands of people indoctrinated by Hamas, and therefore by the Muslim Brotherhood, will blow up the internal political situation in Egypt, by the way, as well as in Jordan. The military regime in Egypt is unstable, especially against the background of economic and food problems. They will either run towards Europe in the guise of refugees, tens of millions, sticking the peoples of neighboring countries to themselves, or if a radical ideology led by a strong leader wins, then they will rush to sweep away the state of Israel.

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Why did Israel decide to gamble everything and do it now? Why now? Beyond national security reasons (were the Israeli intelligence agencies taken by surprise? Did they underestimate the alerts? Did they close their eyes because it was necessary to open hostilities now?) it is perhaps worth including the complex situation in the equation interior of the Jewish state. The country, in fact, is still in turmoil over the controversial justice reform desired by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court in favor of the executive and the Knesset, Israel’s single-chamber parliament.

The reform project has been opposed in recent months not only by civil society, but also by large sectors of the security apparatus. In an attempt to keep the government afloat, Netanyahu has granted space and power to the most extremist souls of the executive, such as the Minister of Internal Security Itamar Ben Gvir. The idea that Hamas seized the opportunity, exploiting a moment of particular weakness and division within the Jewish state to deal a devastating blow, cannot be completely ruled out. But we cannot exclude a specific desire on the part of Tel Aviv to launch long-planned military and expansionist projects. Because the recent history of the IDF’s military strategies also tells us this.

In Tel Aviv everything has always been planned meticulously. From the IDF operational manual we have always known what the main challenges to counter are: states – far (Iran) and near (Lebanon), failed, disintegrating (Syria); sub-state organizations (Hezbollah, Hamas); or terrorist organizations with no connection to a specific state or community (Global Jihad, Palestinian Global Jihad, Islamic State and others).

But something has changed in Israeli military doctrine. For at least three years, the IDF has been ready to sustain a “ring of fire” battle, that is, a definitive war, a sort of All-in, in which the country finds itself surrounded by regional powers.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (L) meets with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (C) and military chiefs at IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv for a security assessment on October 8, 2023 (GPO)

There are some internal documents of the Israeli government and army that tell exactly this. In 2018, Prime Minister Netanyahu presents the National Security 2030 report. That document “assumes that the defense establishment prepares to cope with Iran in the year 2030. In a situation where Iran had not acquired a nuclear capability and assuming a regime similar to the present one is still in control, coping with Iran in 2030 will probably be similar to coping with Iran today. However, the task of coping with Iran will be radically different if we assume that Iran possesses a nuclear capability. In that case, the balance of power between Israel and Iran will change, and it is possible that Iran under a nuclear umbrella will dare to deploy ground divisions, including armored elements, in Iraq and Syria. In the first scenario, Israel should strengthen its air force primarily, while in the second scenario – the IDF will be required to cope with a new and significant state land threat, and the importance assigned to Israel’s armored warfare capabilities will change. In another example, if the Muslim Brotherhood should once again seize power in Egypt, the new situation will rekindle the discussion regarding the deployment of the IDF ground elements and enhancing Israel’s defensive capabilities in armed conflicts between states”.

Reading National Security 2030, one understands how Tel Aviv’s real concern is “scenarios like a nuclear Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood seizing power in Egypt again or the disintegration of the Hashemite regime in Jordan are not zero-probability scenarios”. Palestine does not represent, for the drafters of that document, a “strategic” danger: “while a third Intifada and Palestinian terrorism do not threaten Israel strategically, geopolitical changes Israel does not control will have a decisive effect on Israel’s ability to cope with the threats”.

National Security 2030 is just a political program. But it was developed by IDF with a very specific strategic document. We talk about the adoption of a four-year plan called “Momentum” (Tnufa in Hebrew), initially launched for the period 2020–24. Typically, four-year programs drive the IDF’s force buildup, training, resource allocation, and overall efficiency. According to IDF public statements, the new plan was built upon the scenario of a multifront war and aimed to prepare soldiers for “swift and massive use of force against enemy systems.” Tnufa reportedly also made numerous references to the idea of ​​being “multi-dimensional” and “multi-force”—that is, more tightly integrating naval, land, air, cyber, and intelligence resource. The key concept to understand the current Israeli military strategy is “multifront war”.

Tel Aviv thus imagines itself ready for the final challenge.

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It’s a process that started several years ago. Now for the command of Tsahal the concept of victory has also changed. Victory is either definitive or it is not victory. In 2020, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the development of a new operational concept called Decisive Victory that aimed to change the way Israel fights wars and to redefine victory on the battlefield. The root cause of this change was the evolution in nonstate threats from armed groups in Gaza and Lebanon. The concept was to drive major reforms of the IDF in training, interoperability among the services, weapons procurement, and civil-military relations. However, the efforts encountered significant challenges in terms of politics, financial resources, and the implications for the IDF’s force structure.

One thing is certain from now on. This war will be different. The success of Hamas, the violence of terrorist actions, the structured and massive use of rockets from Gaza and the ability of Palestinian commandos to penetrate inside Israeli territory through techniques, tactics and structured procedures that took the intelligence by surprise Israeli war highlight the emergence of war scenarios and threats that are very different from those that characterized the second Lebanon war, Operation “Strong Cliff” (2014) and Operation “Wall Guardian” (2021). These campaigns cannot be taken as a reference for the preparations of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for the ongoing war, simply because the current situation is the result of the overlap of all potential threats: internal, external, regional and global, intertwined with each other.

Hamas rocket unit. Illustrative image.

It is quite clear that the Israeli offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and in defense of probable internal and external threats, from the West Bank to Lebanon, can develop following the principles of the strategic doctrine of the IDF, as outlined by General Gadi Eizenkot, head of the Israeli Defense General Staff from 2015 to 2019, which, in 2020, was followed by the new operational concept called “Decisive Victory” which defines groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah not as “insurgents” or “guerrillas”, but as “armies organized, well trained, well equipped for their missions” capable of improving their capabilities over time. The reform of the IDF, which follows the dictates of strategic doctrine and operational concept, has also been shaped by concerns about the prospects of horizontal escalation, i.e. the opening of multiple fronts at the same time, which is actually taking place, giving rise to a regionalization of the conflict. By this logic, the ongoing conflict, which began in Gaza, could trigger clashes in the West Bank, southern Lebanon or the Golan Heights.

The consequences of this conflict, yet another piece of a third world war being fought brick by brick (because it is the clash between the West in crisis and the emerging Brics model), extend beyond the Middle Eastern area. And they manage to drag the entire planet into chaos. In the United States they have created a simulation of the worst case economic scenario linked to the Middle Eastern fall-out. Very worst. It is a 10-point decalogue.

1) the conflict becomes regional and Washington becomes officially involved.

2) OPEC responds with an oil embargo.

3) Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz.

4) The price of oil hits 300 dollars a barrel.

5) Europe is falling into an energy crisis worse than 2022.

6) The explosion in energy prices is fueling inflation and causing central banks to start raising rates again.

7) Financial crisis and the global banking system.

8) The debt crisis therefore forces the Fed to return to the field to save the markets. Monetary short circuit.

9) The petrodollar trade collapses.

10) Weimar 2.0, hyperinflation.

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Finally, a brief sociological analysis is necessary. When evaluating Israel’s strategic choices and the decision to go straight towards what Tel Aviv hopes will be the decisive victory, some social and demographic parameters must also be considered.

One factor that Israel takes into great consideration is that of demographic development. Demography plays a crucial role in the conflict, as does its evolution over time. Both populations have grown over the last century, increasing tension in a relatively small area, especially if we exclude desert areas, useless for human settlements.

Israel had just over one million inhabitants at its birth in 1948, but the country has grown stronger and today reaches 9 million, destined according to the latest United Nations projections (medium variant) to reach 10 million in 2030 and 13 million in 2050. He still remains a flea compared to the Muslim giants that surround him. Furthermore, demographic growth is not at all homogeneous, and indeed there are very notable disparities between the various Israeli socio-ethnic communities of great political and social importance.

Within twenty years, the Israeli community will be made up of thirty percent Haredim, ultra-Orthodox Jews. The relationship between the Haredim and the rest of Israeli society could lead to serious geopolitical consequences for Israel; the majority of Haredim are skeptical of Zionism, if not even against the existence of the State of Israel. Their numerical growth is also becoming increasingly problematic for the security of Israel itself, given that the Israeli defense model is essentially based on military leverage to maintain both an offensive and defensive conventional potential sufficient for deterrence. Haredim are exempt from military service.

From a demographic point of view, Israel is small compared to the growing Muslim world around it, and its demographic growth comes above all from communities distrustful or reticent towards the national-Zionist establishment. By 2030, Egypt is expected to reach 125 million inhabitants, Iran 92 million, Iraq 52 million, Turkey 89 million, and Syria 30 million. Also in 2030, an average of 36.5 percent of the Muslim population of the countries surrounding Israel will be between 15 and 34 years old. Also due to this risk of “extinction”, global war is a necessary strategy for Israel today. It is no coincidence that Bibi Netaniayhu, borrowing Winston Churchill’s speech, announced the war with these words: “the Western world stood with you 80 years ago during your darkest hour, this is our darkest hour”

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