Israel at war

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Written by Pietro Pinter, a Doctor in International Relations, author of italian-language geopolitics blog inimicizie.com 

Something very serious has started in Israel, which will lead to a conflict on a level not seen since the one with Hezbollah in 2006, and perhaps even higher. Happening on the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, it is probably no coincidence.

Militants from various Hamas-linked Palestinian factions have managed to infiltrate Israeli defences and attack a number of police and IDF positions in villages near the Gaza Strip. The initial successes – the capture of military vehicles and even at least one Merkava tank – make a strong response by Tel Aviv – which has already declared a state of war against Hamas and its affiliated factions – mandatory.

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Meanwhile, the other Palestinian factions mobilise, and the mosques in Jerusalem incite jihad through their muezzins.

That this is happening now is also a result of the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf, which has weakened Israel’s position. Saudi-iranian normalization made clear that the time would soon come for Tel Aviv to choose between difficult options (giving up something to normalise, or taking drastic measures against Palestine and its Arab population).

The time has come, we will know the answer soon.

One of the crucial turning points now will be the reaction and of Hezbollah in the north – which still remains firm – and clearly of the other regional actors such as the Gulf monarchies, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Iran. The potential for a conflict not only within Israel and the Palestinian territories exists. Remember that Israel has an undeclared nuclear deterrent.

Palestinian forces have taken control of seven population centres around the Gaza Strip, the IDF bulletin reports. A control that cannot reasonably be maintained in the face of the armoured advance that Israel is about to launch, having already recaptured some positions. The main question is what will happen when the IDF enters the Gaza perimeter, and (if) what other actors will mobilise.

Both Turkey and Egypt have taken a (at least overtly) neutralist stance in their public statements. Recently, an unspoken understanding had led to the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood from both the ranks of Hamas and the Turkish political scene, under pressure from Egypt. This has led to a rapprochement and normalisation of diplomatic relations between Ankara and Cairo – two capitals that have tended to be hostile since the victory of political Islam in Turkey – centred precisely on Palestine.

According to Israeli media Cairo warned Tel Aviv not to occupy the Gaza Strip. Possible retaliation, depending on the source, ranges from generic “consequences” to predicting Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict.

Iran through government officials declares – not surprisingly – its full support for the Palestinians. The European and North American chancelleries, on the other hand, issue statements of unconditional support for Israel. Ukraine supports Israel aswell, while Russia urges for immediate de-escalation.

Even Saudi Arabia joins the Turkish-Egyptian position of calling for “an immediate de-escalation”, while assigning full responsibility to Israel for what has happened.

Naturally, what is happening will have strong repercussions on the normalisation agreement with Israel that is being worked on more and more intensively. The possible scenarios are very different among them. Two extremes:

– A replay of the Kippur War: a war that started with the Palestinians in a position of strength, ended thanks to pressure from external actors before their total defeat. The possibility of a peace agreement similar to that of 1973 opens up

– Palestinian action highlights the contradictions and nips any possibility of a “historic compromise” in the bud. Israel must increase its control over the Palestinian territories by every possible means to ensure its own security, but remains isolated in the region.

The political situation in Saudi Arabia and Israel also imposes enormous caution on the respective governments in their bilateral relations. In Riyadh, normalisation with Iran has come at a cost, which will be difficult for the hardline Wahabbist wing – the one that took control of the great mosque in Mecca in 1979 and forged the current modus vivendi between the Al-Saud monarchy and the Sunni clergy – to digest. In Israel, on the other hand, one of the “toughest” coalitions on Arab-Israeli relations in a long time is supporting the current government, the result of a compromise between Nethanyahu’s Likud and minor nationalist and orthodox parties.

The strategy outlined by Nethanyahu now is the following:

– Liberate the territories lost so far
– Reinforce external borders and potential crisis areas to prevent other actors from joining the war
– Make those responsible pay an exorbitant price

Regarding the first point, advanced elements of the IDF are operating on the front line while others are mobilizing. A video shows fighting in Sderot, the largest settlement the Palestinian militants have entered, that as of now seems to be back into israeli control.

As for the second, the border with Jordan – where some tribal and political formations are urging their militants to ‘march to the border’ – has been closed, and the army has mobilised on the Golan Heights, on the Syrian border. It seems that the IDF is conducting exercises with live ammunition, with the clear aim of deterring actions from Syria and Lebanon.

The third point is the crucial one: a ground operation in Gaza has already been declared by the IDF, while air operations have already begun. This is the point at which the involvement – both diplomatic and military – of external actors will become stronger and more likely.

It should also be noted that the Israeli defence minister has pointed to Iran as being directly responsible for the attack, and has announced that the country will pay a high price. But what that will precisely entail?

From a military point of view:

– This is the first time Israel has even temporarily lost territory, since the 2005 Gaza withdrawal (which although ’caused’ by the Palestinians was still an Israeli choice). The IDF lost at least two military bases on the Gaza border, with tanks and armoured vehicles inside, from what the footage shows.

– The first destruction of a Merkava tank since the 2006 war with Hezbollah. The first ever of a Merkava equipped with the Trophy active protection system, introduced around 2010, which over the years has protected Israeli tanks from dozens of anti-tank missiles, even in high-intensity operations. Simple as it is as a tactic, not even one of the most advanced armies in the world has yet managed to find a truly effective solution to protect tanks from bombs dropped by small commercial drones. The various cages, tyres, wooden and cardboard constructions seen in Ukraine and Syria have made many ‘laugh’, but they perform a real function.

– Israel opens to mobilisation of ‘hundreds of thousands’ of reservists and declares a state of emergency throughout the country. Officials declare that the war will last for ‘weeks’.

Something very different from the usual clashes – however harsh – between Hamas/JI and Israel of the past 15 years. As much as the correlation of forces undoubtedly favours, and to a large extent, the Israelis, what happened today is bound to have a traumatic effect, and not only because of the brutal episodes of violence that have been circulating online.

Fifty years after the Yom Kippur War – a few days before, Sharon derided as unrealistic the possibility that the Egyptians could cross the Suez Canal – Tel Aviv once again finds itself having underestimated its adversaries. Conclusions will have to be drawn from this.

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